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Selecting Pennsylvania Judges in the
Twenty-First Century
Paul D. Carrington* & Adam Long**
Appointing judges for life was a late seventeenth century English
idea, crafted to protect the judiciary of noble status from domination by
royalty. Since 1840, no entity that has composed and ratified a
constitution has adopted that practice. Electing judges was an idea of
nineteenth century Americans who believed in the right to self-
government and who sought to protect their judges from domination by
sordid politicians. Merit selection of judges, subject to periodic retention
elections, was an idea of early twentieth century Americans who
believed that law is a science or an arcane technology unrelated to
politics and properly entrusted to experts. Many Americans in the
twenty-first century have their doubts about the virtues of self-
government, and no one believes that law in America is an apolitical
technology that can be entrusted to elite experts.
Contested judicial elections, whatever their utility in the nineteenth
century, are no longer defensible if political campaigns are marked by
costly television advertising that requires contestants to raise and spend
enormous sums of money to secure or hold judicial office. The
defensibility of contested judicial elections shrinks further when those
costly means of campaigning are made almost immune to legal restraint
as a result of extravagant interpretations of the First Amendment made
by the Supreme Court, interpretations that protect the right to attack
anonymously the integrity of candidates.'
* Chadwick Professor of Law Emeritus, Duke University School of Law. There is
a vast literature on this subject, most, of it written by political scientists. Much of it is
cited in Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998 at 79. This article is in substantial part a rewriting
and redirection of Paul D. Carrington, Selecting North Carolina Judges in the 21"s
Century, N.C. ST. B.J., Spring 2002, at 1.
** J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2002.
1. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-57 (1995)
(holding that a state statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature violated the free speech provisions of the First Amendment); Owen G. Abbe &
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Merit selection, whatever its virtues in the first half of the twentieth
century, is likewise no longer defensible when judges and courts all over
the nation daily make "impact decisions" of the most overt political
nature. While the American and Pennsylvania Bar Associations have
long favored merit selection, 2 insufficient public support from voters
presents an insurmountable obstacle to its adoption. 3 It is also a problem
that periodic retention elections have proven, in recent times, to invite
costly electronic assaults on politically defenseless sitting judges.
It is therefore time to try to rethink the problem and revise the
Constitution of Pennsylvania. To find a solution appropriate to our
times, we need to lay aside both the idea that the courts can be entrusted
to wholly independent lawyer-experts and the idea that political
campaigns for judicial office are a constructive method of selecting
judges. Although it is essential to give the legal profession an
opportunity to influence the selection process, it may be equally essential
to allow voters a role sufficient to reassure citizens that the courts belong
to them and to remind sitting judges that they govern with the consent of
their fellow citizens, not by anointment.
It helps in thinking about judicial selection to sort out the judges by
their different roles. Common Pleas Court judges, the trial judges for
most cases,4 are the most important because they have the most direct
Paul S. Harrison, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286
(2002).
2. See, e.g., Jeff Blumenthal, ABA House of Delegates Endorses Public Funding of
Judicial Elections, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 6, 2002, at I (describing how
Pennsylvania delegates to the American Bar Association's House of Delegates would
only support a resolution endorsing public financing of judicial elections after an
amendment was added stating that the ABA still preferred merit selection to judicial
elections); John L. Kennedy, PBA Sets Judicial Campaign Guidelines, PA. L. WEEKLY,
Dec. 5, 1994, at 1 (reporting that the president of the Pennsylvania Bar Association stated
that his organization supports merit selection or gubernatorial appointment ofjudges over
a popular election-based system).
3. See, e.g., Philip L. Dubois, Voter Responses to Court Reform: Merit Judicial
Selection on the Ballot, 73 JUDICATURE 238, 240-41 (1990) (noting that, in 1969,
Pennsylvania voters rejected a proposed merit selection system for the state); Alexandra
Makosky, Comment, The King 's Bench Power in Pennsylvania: A Unique Power That
Provides Efficient Results, 101 DICK. L. REV. 671, 680 n.61 (1997) (discussing a 1995
study that found that only thirty-five percent of Pennsylvania lawmakers supported a
merit selection system). The lack of popular support for merit selection is not solely a
Pennsylvania phenomenon. In 1987, the voters of Ohio rejected merit selection for state
judges by a two-to-one margin. E.g., T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor
Campaign Donors, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 15, 2000, at IA.
4. Of course, the special courts, which "constitute the 'grass roots' level" of the
Pennsylvania Court system, have original jurisdiction over specifically designated
matters. ADMIN. OFFICE OF PA. COURTS, REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT 1999, at 10-11 (1999). The special courts include the
District Justice Courts, the Philadelphia Municipal Court, the Philadelphia Traffic Court,
and the Pittsburgh Magistrates Court. Id. The Commonwealth Court also has original
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impact on individual citizens. They exercise great power and enjoy great
discretion. Trial judges are also the hardest to select because their job
tests qualities of character that are not ordinarily tested in the practice of
law, or any other activity. While their political prejudices may influence
their work, trial judges do not make law, and hence their politics are not
really very important. To restrain trial judges from inappropriate
conduct, the most important institution is appellate review. Additional
restraint can also be provided by effective enforcement of sound
standards of judicial ethics. Especially for trial judges, who are exposed
to so many opportunities to misuse their powers, the enforcement of
judicial ethics is an essential feature of a sound legal system.
For these reasons, it would seem that the initial selection of the trial
judge should be the responsibility of someone or some group accessible
to the organized bar, but not controlled by them. The governor is the
most obvious choice, not least because that officer is accountable to the
electorate. It is, however, a problem that the governor's constituency is
statewide and the trial judges serve local constituencies. Moreover, if the
judges are to serve limited terms, a judge so appointed would not only be
beholden to the governor for the opportunity to remain in office, but at
risk of non-reappointment for reasons having nothing to do with the
merits of his or her performance. Accordingly, the judges would lack
sufficient independence to forestall political manipulation of the judicial
process.
What is needed to select trial judges is a constitutional institution
(call it a Commission on the Judiciary) composed of persons appointed
by succeeding governors and the leaderships of the Pennsylvania Senate
to assure that the group is beholden to no constituency. Perhaps its
members might be required to be of an age sufficient to make personal
ambition no longer a factor in their judgments, making it more likely that
they will be inclined to give proper but not excessive heed to the
assessments of lawyers. This Commission might also take on
responsibility for the enforcement of the standards of judicial ethics and
the evaluation of judicial performance by lawyers and litigants. So far,
this thinking tracks that of the advocates of merit selection.
The problem with such a commission as an institution appointing
judges is that this would disempower the community in which the trial
judge sits and may be insufficient to liberate the judges from an
unwelcome servitude, or appearance of servitude, to the elite class who
put them on the bench. It is for this reason that merit selection is not
saleable in our time. Indeed, very few states ever seriously considered
jurisdiction over certain claims involving the Commonwealth government and
government officials. Id. at 12.
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merit selection of trial judges, apparently for the reason that there was
too much political resistance to the idea, especially in rural communities
resistant to domination by state governments.
The need for citizen participation might be supplied by a procedure
of "voter confirmation," putting the name of the candidate nominated by
the Commission before the electorate in the district in which the judge
would serve. This would resemble the retention election, but would be
conducted before the judge is allowed to sit on a trial. The only court we
know to be selected in this way is the Supreme Court of Japan.5 With a
similar device, Utah requires its judges to stand for a retention election in
the third year after their appointment.6 The advantage of holding the
popular election at the outset of a judicial career is that the election sends
an appropriate signal to both citizens and judges that the judges are
servants to their constituents. Also, an initial popular election makes it
difficult for an interest group to launch a televised personal attack on the
candidate selected by the commission.
To assure some integrity to voter confirmation, the Commission
should be expected to publicize prospective nominations for comment
and then to circulate a guide making the case for its nominations,
including explanations of any endorsements and any protests it may have
considered. It should also be prepared to defend its nominees against
electronic attack by political interest groups of whatever stripe.
After an initial term of six or eight years in which a judge can
demonstrate the personal qualities needed to perform the work of a trial
judge, the commission might be expected to make a recommendation as
to whether the judge should be retained for an additional period. That
decision, too, would be put before the electorate for confirmation.
Reconfirmation might be for a longer term, so that the two terms together
might constitute, for most judges, a full judicial career.
Pennsylvania Superior and Commonwealth Court judges
entertaining appeals of right have front-line responsibility for restraining
maverick Common Pleas Court judges. Appellate judge is a very
different job from that of the trial judge. It requires close attention to the
details of the record of the proceedings below and to laws and legal
precedent cited by counsel. Many such judges, having learned in school
that appellate judges make law, presume that they, too, should make
some law by writing learned opinions on unsettled points of law. But in
reality it is hardly so for the Superior and Commonwealth Courts,
because anything they write of significance to anyone other than the
5. KENPO, art. 79, reprinted in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
20 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flantz eds., 1990).
6. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9.
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parties will be subject to possible review by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Hence, their qualifications to make law are of minimal
importance in their selection. The qualities most needed in intermediate
court judges is that they must be attentive to lawyers and to the conduct
of the trial court and faithful to the guidance of the Supreme Court.
What is needed therefore is a process for selecting Superior and
Commonwealth Court judges that will reinforce those traits. The need
for adherence to the guidance of the higher court suggests that they
should be selected by that court. Selection by the Supreme Court would
make clear where the ultimate responsibility for judicial lawmaking
should lie. But the Supreme Court might be limited in its selection by
requiring prior experience as a trial judge as a condition to the
nomination. This requirement would link the Court of Appeals judges to
the institutions both below and above them in the structural hierarchy
and reinforce a correct sense of what their roles are, strengthening the
pyramid image already used to represent Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial
System.7
Because of the nature of their work, there is very little to be said in
favor of voters confirming or reconfirming the selection of intermediate
appellate court judges. There is little political content to their work. It is
in no one's interest for such judges to be seeking the approval of some
group outside the judiciary. And their work is all but invisible, not
merely to the electorate, but even to the profession. Voter confirmation
should therefore not apply to them. Their terms might be as brief as six
years and renewable, or much longer if they were subject to removal by a
supermajority of the Supreme Court when its members have lost
confidence in an individual judge.
In contrast, it is clear to all that justices of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania hold political office. Moreover, no one today would
question the dictum of John Stuart Mill:
The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or fellow-citizens, to
impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on
others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some
of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever
kept under restraint by anything but want of power.
8
While restraints are needed, they are not easily fashioned. Citizens and
lawyers may unite in the conviction that sitting Supreme Court justices
should be independent from the influences of interest group politics, but
it is not obvious that a satisfactory alternative can be devised.
7. E.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF PA. COURTS, supra note 4, at 9.
8. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (1885), quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 467 (1971) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The voter confirmation process suggested for trial judges might in
some respects seem to be a reasonably agreeable method, except that the
Commission nominating trial judges should aspire to be as apolitical as
circumstances permit in nominating trial judges. That aspiration will not
work for the selection of Supreme Court justices. Given the political
importance of their roles, there must be a political forum in which
interest groups can compete for the selection of high court justices whose
politics they prefer. The Commission should not be that kind of forum.
We conclude that the best method of selecting Supreme Court
justices is appointment by the Governor with the assent of a
supermajority of the Senate. The supermajority requirement would
prevent the appointment of persons known to be partisans of marginal
political views that they might be tempted to impose on the people.
Because governors and senators are themselves politically accountable to
the people to be served if they seat a bad justice, the case for voter
confirmation as an additional requirement is less strong. It would,
however, serve to emphasize that the justices are not solely indebted for
their power and status to partisan politicians, but also owe their power to
all the people.
To assure their independence, the terms of appointment of Supreme
Court justices should be substantially lengthened. In New York, it is
fourteen years, 9 in the District of Columbia fifteen.' 0 The purpose of
such long terms is to diminish the vulnerability of sitting justices to
manipulation by interest group politics. The risks associated with longer
terms are much less with respect to high court judges because they
exercise very little power as individuals. Longer terms lend stability to
the institution and coherence to judge-made law. A fifteen-year term
would generally be a career, for it would be a rare judge who would seek
to be reappointed after serving such a term. Interest group pressure
could be mounted on those looking for reappointment. If that is a
concern, it could be prevented by restricting the justices to a single term.
By facing separately the problems of selecting Common Pleas Court
judges, Commonwealth and Superior Court judges, and Supreme Court
justices, this scheme seeks to employ selection methods that are shaped
by the different roles to be performed by different kinds of judges.
Because the long terms of Supreme Court justices would make them
virtually invulnerable to interest group politics, the judiciary as a whole
would be assured almost complete political independence. Yet, if the
9. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(a).
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11.1502 (2001) (stating that all judges in the District of
Columbia court system shall serve for terms of fifteen years, with a mandatory retirement
age of seventy-four).
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court wandered too far from the conventional understandings, later
appointees might be expected to restore its balance. The trial judges
would know that their jurisdiction derived from a vote of the people, and
the Superior and Commonwealth Court judges would know that,
although they are independent of all politics, they are not independent of
the law.

